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Investors’ Trash, Taxpayers’ Treasure: The Banco
Popular Wipeout and Contingent Convertible Bonds

I. INTRODUCTION
One man’s trash is another man’s treasure. The old adage applies
to the banking and finance industry and there is no better instrument to
illustrate this adage than the volatile contingent convertible bond.
Contingent convertible bonds (“CoCo bonds”) are hybrid debt
instruments.1 Once the issuing bank’s capital ratios fall below a certain
threshold or regulators determine it is appropriate, the bond is converted
into stock for the bondholder or written down if the bank needs to raise
its capital levels.2 These bonds have enticed investors due to their
attractively high yields. 3 However, recent events show that the yields
may not be worth the risk to bondholders, but could be invaluable to
taxpayers.4 CoCo bonds came about after the 2008 financial crisis and
were designed as part of a global regulatory shift to prevent banks from
needing taxpayer-funded bailouts.5 Both the Third Basel Accord (“Basel
1. Oscar Williams-Grut, Here’s What CoCo Bonds Are and Why Investors Are Freaking
Out About Them, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:11 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/what-are-coco-bonds-2016-2.
2. See Banco Popular: First European AT1 Hybrid (CoCo) Triggered, BONDADVISER
(June 15, 2017), http://www.bondadviser.com.au/blog/banco-popular-first-european-at1hybrid-coco-triggered/ [hereinafter BONDADVISER] (“CoCos are the equivalent of posttransitional Australian Bank Additional Tier 1 (AT1) Hybrids which carry Capital and NonViability Triggers. They pay discretionary coupons and carry the potential (Capital and NonViability Triggers) to be converted into shares if the bank’s capital ratios fall below a certain
threshold, making them the first capital holders (behind equity investors) to be wiped out in a
bank failure.”); see also Erica Jeffery, AT1 Capital/CoCo bonds: What You Should Know,
EUROMONEY (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kqjlwvsz26k/at1capitalcoco-bonds-what-you-should-know (“[CoCo bonds] contain a contractual provision to
convert into ordinary shares or are [written down] if a bank needs to raise its capital levels,
once the CET1 ratio threshold has been breached, or if authorities determine the issuer has
reached the point-of-non-viability (PONV).”).
3. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (describing the typical high yields carried by CoCo
bonds and the two-fold effect the design is intended to have).
4. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (discussing investors’ growing fears in aspects of
the bond, such as missed interest payments).
5. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (“Coco bonds were cooked up after the financial
crisis as a way to prevent banks from needing any more state bailouts.”).
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III”) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) responded to the crisis by setting capital and
liquidity requirements to manage the risk of systemically important
financial institutions (“SIFIs”).6
Should capital and liquidity
requirements prove incapable of solving the too big to fail problem,
however, the concept of contingent capital appears to serve as an
appealing alternative. 7 Debt that converts to equity contingent on signs
of institutional failure would ideally serve a two-fold purpose: it lessens
the bank’s debt burden while boosting its capital. 8 The conversion of debt
into equity is triggered by the institution coming under financial stress,
and is designed to prevent the need to bail out failing institutions by
creating a bail-in alternative that imposes losses on bondholders rather
than taxpayers.9 The recent acquisition of Banco Popular by rival Banco
Santander SA (“Santander”) in June 2017 was the first time these
instruments foisted losses on the bondholders and serves as the first
illustration for investors and institutions alike of CoCo bonds being put
to the test.10 As the recent failure of Banco Popular revealed, CoCo bonds
6. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 2 (2010), http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (“The Basel Committee is raising the resilience of the banking
sector by strengthening the regulatory capital framework . . . .”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 171, 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2016)
(setting leverage and risk-based capital requirements). Basel III mandates a phase-in of
increased capital ratios. The rationale is that increase in capital provides greater cushion to
absorb losses so that the larger the cushion, the more losses the institution can assume before
reaching insolvency. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 561 (4th ed. 2011) (“Areas of
emphasis included raising the quality of Tier 1 capital, introducing a leverage ratio, . . .
implementing a liquidity coverage ratio to ensure that the institution has sufficient liquidity
to survive one month of acute stress, promoting build-up of capital in good times so that it
could be drawn upon in times of stress, and requiring higher capital or risk weights to capture
the risks of complex trading activities and securitization exposures.”). Congress continued
the renewed emphasis on capital in the Dodd-Frank Act. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W.
MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES : CASES AND MATERIALS
562 (4th ed. 2011).
7. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (“Coco bonds were cooked up after the financial
crisis as a way to prevent banks from needing any more state bailouts.”).
8. Williams-Grut, supra note 1.
9. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (Explaining that “rather than the bank owing you
money, you suddenly own a little bit of the bank[,]” which is “a way to prevent banks from
needing any more state bailouts.”).
10. See Robert Smith, Coco Bond Contagion Contained After Banco Popular Wipeout,
FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1b26153a-4b7c-11e7-a3f4-c742b
9791d43 (discussing the sudden collapse of Banco Popular’s CoCo bonds as the first instance
losses have been imposed on AT1 bondholders and that the CoCo bond contagion was
successfully contained after the wipeout of Banco Popular).
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appear to be successful in absorbing some loss suffered by the issuer,11
but overall, fall short in rescuing an institution from failure and should
not be relied on to do so.12
This Note discusses how the recent acquisition of Banco Popular
and its CoCo bonds’ wipeout is revealing of the fundamental
characteristics and functions of the instrument through discussion of four
major areas of the contingent convertible bond. First, the bonds’ onetime conversion may be inadequate to prevent failure; 13 second, there is
a lack of uniformity in CoCo bonds’ trigger mechanism; 14 third,
conversion of CoCo bonds contributes to increasing market uncertainty
and contagion; 15 and finally, CoCo bonds encompass certain inherent
risks for investors unlike any other type of bond instrument. 16 As such,
these CoCo bonds, or Additional Tier 1 (“AT1”) securities,17 may be
inherently risky, exotic high-yield bonds in and of themselves and are
likely not dependable in offering systemic protection to financial
institutions.18 Capital rules and regulatory requirements must be globally
consistent to ensure a level playing field and to avoid regulatory
arbitrage. 19 Further, there is a need for uniformity in the bonds’ lossabsorption mechanism and greater investor knowledge of the risks that
come with the bonds.20

11. See id. (“The sudden collapse in the value of Banco Popular’s bonds has been
dramatic. Its now worthless €1.25bn of Additional Tier 1 bonds were still trading at about
half of face value before the bank’s resolution and takeover by rival Santander was announced
on Wednesday morning. This is the first time losses have been imposed on AT1
bondholders.”).
12. See BONDADVISER, supra note 2 (describing the auctioning of Banco Popular initiated
by the European Central Bank, the entity that deemed Popular “failing or likely to fail” and
called for a point of non-viability trigger of the bank’s CoCos).
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. See infra Part IV.D.
17. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12, 15 (setting out
details of Additional Tier 1 capital as a method of strengthening the global capital framework).
18. See Thomas Hale, Credit Ratings Bolster Risky Bank Bonds, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/98c41bd0-562e-11e5-a28b-50226830d644 (“Exotic,
high-yielding bank bonds developed in the aftermath of the financial crisis are increasingly
attracting investment grade credit ratings, a category that allows big institutional investors to
buy such debt.”).
19. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., THE BASEL III TIMELINE (2015), https://
www.isda-iq.org/2015/10/16/the-basel-iii-timeline/.
20. See infra Part V.
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This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II provides a regulatory
background and describes the impetus behind the creation of CoCo
bonds.21 Part III introduces the purpose and design of CoCo bonds. 22
Part IV analyzes the aforementioned problem areas of CoCo bonds in the
context of the Banco Popular wipeout.23
Part V proposes
recommendations to make uniform the trigger mechanism of the
instrument.24 Finally, Part VI summarizes the findings and problem areas
as revealed by Banco Popular’s buyout and concludes this note. 25
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND AND IMPETUS BEHIND THE CREATION
OF COCO BONDS
The 2008 financial crisis revealed the banking sector’s reliance
on capital bases that were insufficient and poor in quality. 26 As a result,
regulators recognized a need for higher and better quality bank capital. 27
In 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“the Committee”)
issued Basel III, a global agreement on banking supervision in response
to the financial crisis. 28 Basel III sets out an international framework for
liquidity risk measurement, standards, and monitoring, which presents
the Committee’s reform measures to strengthen the regulation,
supervision, and risk management of the banking sector. 29 In its aim to
reform “quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base,”30 the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, BASEL III – ADDITIONAL TIER 1 GOING-CONCERN CAPITAL AND
TIER 2 CAPITAL 1 (2010), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2010/12/baseliii—additional-tier-1-goingconcern-capital-and-tier-2-capital
(explaining
the
Basel
Committee’s standards for better quality capital in addressing systemic risks to the banking
sector).
27. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 2. The Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and
central banks from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 1 n.1.
28. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 1.
29. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 1.
30. ZE’-EV D EIGER ET AL., CONTINGENT CAPITAL SECURITIES : AN OVERVIEW, MORRISON
& FOERSTER LLP (Apr. 1, 2016), https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I8417b230
1cb111e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/
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regulatory accord cracks down on risk management by implementing
more demanding capital and liquidity standards. 31 The accord also sets
forth rules on the type and quality of capital banks must have. 32 It
requires total regulatory capital to include Tier 1 capital, which consists
of Common Equity Tier 1 (“CET1”) as well as AT1.33 In furthering the
goals of its regulatory capital requirement, Basel III provides a lossabsorbency criteria that must be satisfied for non-common equity to be
classified as Tier 1.34 Non-common equity must be capable of principal
loss absorption through either conversion to equity in the form of
common shares at an objective pre-specified trigger point, or principal
write-down mechanism which allocates losses to the bondholders, also at
a pre-specified trigger point.35 If these criteria are met, issued CoCo
Bonds would qualify as AT1 instruments and therefore be considered
regulatory capital. 36 In 2011, the Basel Committee announced that global
systemically important financial institutions (“G-SIFIs”) would not be
allowed to use contingent convertible bonds to meet Basel III’s capital
requirements. 37 However, use of contingent capital to meet national loss

FullText.html?originationContext=knowHow&transitionType=KnowHowItem&contextDat
a=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.
31. Basel III Summary, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSN
364_8.8.0/com.ibm.ima.tut/tut/bas_imp/bas3_sum.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2017)
(summarizing the provisions of Basel III and specifically, the capital requirements introduced
to strengthen banks’ capital requirements and introduce more capital buffers).
32. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., supra note 19.
33. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12.
34. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 17.
35. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING S UPERVISION, supra note 6, at 17. Per the Basel III
Accord, contingent convertible bonds do not have to convert in order to meet the Additional
Tier 1 criteria. However, the accord specifies several criteria for CoCos for inclusion in AT1
capital, such as, that the CoCos be issued and paid-in, is perpetual, is callable only after a
minimum of five years, has discretionary dividends/coupon payments, and that any repayment
of principal must have prior supervisory approval. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
supra note 6, at 17.
36. Jeffery, supra note 2.
37. See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, CLIENTS & FRIENDS MEMO:
CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE BONDS AND THE IMPACT OF BASEL III (2011), http://
www.cadwalader.com/uploads/cfmemos/del_6c7bccb69301edb86111be23d5cf8ea2.pdf
(“An example of these supplementary national requirements is a proposal by the Swiss
Financial Market Supervisory Authority . . . [which requires] Swiss banks to meet total capital
ratio requirements of 19 percent. Of this proposed 19 percent total capital ratio, large Swiss
banks may use CoCos to meet 9 percent of their total capital ratio. The remaining 10 percent
must be held in the form of common equity, comfortably covering the ‘Basel’ element of the
capital requirement.”).
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absorbency requirements supplementing Basel’s loss absorbency
requirements would be condoned by the Committee. 38
Basel III must be implemented by countries into their own
national laws in order to be legally binding. 39 The Basel Committee
began phasing in its Basel III requirements in 2013 and full Basel III
implementation is expected to be finalized in 2019 according to the
Committee timetable. 40
As for the United States, Dodd-Frank contains provisions relating
to capital requirements for U.S. banking institutions. 41 Specifically,
Dodd-Frank calls for stricter prudential standards for SIFIs.42 Of the nine
recommendations for greater regulation, five concern additional capital,
contingent capital, or liquidity requirements. 43 In terms of capital
requirements, both Dodd-Frank and Basel III provide explicit minimum
leverage ratios—capital over total assets—along with minimum capital
ratios—capital over risk-weighted assets.44 Specific to CoCo bonds,
38. Id.
39. EIGER ET AL., supra note 30; see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,

BASEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/
basel/basel-default.htm (describing Basel III as a comprehensive set of reforms and laying out
recent updates on the Federal Reserve Board’s proposed rules similar to the requirements of
Basel III, such as provisions to strengthen the liquidity positions of large financial
institutions). In the United States, the Federal Reserve Board finalized a rule to implement
Basel III capital rules in July 2013 to ensure banks maintain strong capital positions by
increasing both the quantity and quality of capital held by U.S. banking organizations. BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., B ASEL R EGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2017), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/basel/basel-default.htm.
40. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., supra note 19; see Press Release, Bank
for Int’l Settlements, Twelfth Progress Report on Adoption of Basel III Standards Published
by the Basel Comm. (2017), http://www.bis.org/press/p170425.htm (updating readers of the
adoption status of Basel III standards for each BCBS member jurisdiction as of the end of
March 2017). As of the Spring 2017 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Basel III
adoption progress report, implementation of standards, such as total loss-absorbing capacity
(“TLAC”) holdings are underway for member jurisdictions. Press Release, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Twelfth Progress Report on Adoption of Basel III Standards Published by the
Basel Comm. (2017), http://www.bis.org/press/p170425.htm.
41. Dodd-Frank § 115, 12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2016) (requiring the Financial Stability
Oversight Council to submit a report to Congress regarding a study on contingent capital
requirements for nonbank financial companies and large bank holding companies).
42. See A. PATRICK DOYLE, ET AL., ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, ADVISORY: DODD-FRANK
ACT MANDATES STRICTER CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2010),
https://files.arnoldporter.com/advisory—doddfrank_act_mandates_stricter_capital_requirements_071610.pdf (“[The Dodd-Frank Act]
imposes a number of more stringent capital requirements. . . .”).
43. Id. The provision including imposition of more stringent capital requirements is set
forth in the “Collins Amendment” of the Dodd-Frank Act. Id.
44. Kevin F. Barnard & Alan W. Avery, Basel III v. Dodd-Frank: What Does It Mean
for US Banks, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (Jan. 2011), http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/
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however, Dodd-Frank commissioned a study of the bonds, to be
commandeered by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).45
While its findings were overall inconclusive on CoCo bonds, FSOC
placed emphasis on its concerns over the trigger mechanism of CoCo
bond instruments in its final 2012 report. 46
Nevertheless, while there had been discussion between the
Federal Reserve and the U.S. banking industry to introduce contingent
capital in U.S. banks in the wake of Basel III, some interpreted a 2011
speech by then Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner as a sign that the
United States was no longer seriously considering a contingent
convertible requirement. 47 Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s June 2013
final rules implementing Basel III in the United States require that the
paid-in amount of any instrument must classify as equity 48 to qualify as

article/28829/basel-iii-v-dodd-frank-does-mean-us-banks/ (highlighting the differences
between Basel III and Dodd-Frank Act in capital ratio requirements of banks and how they
conflict in implementation).
45. Dodd-Frank §115, 12 U.S.C. § 5325(c) (2016) (setting out specifically what the
Dodd-Frank Act requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council to study regarding
contingent capital requirements, such as an evaluation of the amounts of contingent capital
that should be required of institutions).
46. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STUDY OF A
CONTINGENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES AND
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 19 (2012), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studiesreports/Documents/Co%20co%20study[2].pdf (expounding on the findings of the study
through a review of the types and structures of contingent capital instruments and its potential
benefits and drawbacks); see also PAUL GLASSERMAN & ENRICO PEROTTI, THE
UNCONVERTIBLE COCO BONDS 6 (2017), http://fbf.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Theunconvertible-CoCo-bonds-Glasserman-Perotti-March-2017.pdf (discussing the background
of CoCo bonds and their weakness in their inability to provide going concern convertibility).
“[T]here are a range of potential issues that could be associated with contingent capital
instruments, depending on their structure and, in particular, the structure and timing of
conversion triggers. Therefore, at this time, the Council recommends that contingent capital
instruments remain an area for continued private sector innovation. The Council encourages
the Federal Reserve and other financial regulators to continue to study the advantages and
disadvantages of including contingent capital and bail-in instruments in their regulatory
capital frameworks.” FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 19.
47. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5; see Tim Geithner, Treasury Secretary,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks to the International Monetary Conference (2011), https:/
/www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1202.aspx [hereinafter Treasury
Secretary Remarks] (“[W]e do not need to impose . . . any of the three other proposed forms
of additional capital – convertible, bail in, contingent capital instruments, or counter cyclical
capital requirements.”).
48. As according to generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). HAL S. SCOTT,
CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS 191
(MIT Press, 2016) (discussing contingent capital as an alternative resolution system designed
to resolve the too-big-to-fail problem without public support).
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Tier 1 capital.49 This thereby precludes contingent convertible debt from
qualifying prior to conversion. 50 A large number of European and Asian
banks were expected to and do issue CoCo bonds in order to meet capital
requirements set above the Basel III minimums. 51 However, in the United
States, no banks have issued CoCo bonds to date. 52 A major attributing
reason is the likelihood of unfavorable tax treatment: CoCo bonds in the
United States may be treated not as debt, but equity, and thus the interest
payments would not be tax deductible. 53
Countries have been divided on the issue of whether contingent
capital is the right tool to deal with ex ante SIFI risk-control and ex post
failure containment. 54 While Europe and the United States have pushed
for bank taxes as a method of correcting adverse externalities such as
those arising from excessive risk taking, 55 other countries, such as
Canada, vouch for contingent capital. 56 Indeed, officials have conceded

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. CADWALADER, supra note 37, at 1; see Paul J. Davies, Investors Diving Into Risky

Bank Bonds, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-divinginto-risky-bank-bonds-1514299178 (“[C]ontingent convertible bonds, or cocos, are mainly
issued by European and Asian banks. . . .”).
52. CADWALADER, supra note 37, at 1.
53. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 7 (“An additional
drawback, from the perspective of potential issuers, is that depending upon the structure of
the instrument, the interest payment may not be tax deductible by the issuer, potentially
resulting in the issuance of a debt instrument that is significantly more costly than typical
subordinated debt.”); see also Treasury Secretary Remarks, supra note 47 (discussing that in
the U.S., the largest firms will be required to hold an additional surcharge of common equity
and that contingent capital will not be imposed on top of that).
54. See Viral V. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements,
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL
FINANCE 144 (Wiley ed., 2010) (discussing the concept of contingent capital in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis and potential limitations in its ability to curb taxpayer-funded
rescuing of failing systemically important financial institutions). A primary purpose of
contingent capital is to avoid regulatory bailout after failure (ex post failure). Id. However,
the question remains on whether CoCos can control institutions’ risk-taking before the fact
(ex ante risk-control). Id.
55. See INT’L M ONETARY FUND, A FAIR AND S UBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR : FINAL REPORT FOR THE G-20 16 (2010), https://www.imf.org/external/np/
g20/pdf/062710b.pdf (“Specific proposals include . . . taxes on short-term and/or foreign
exchange borrowing, on high rates of return . . . and for corrective taxes related to notions of
systemic risks and interconnectedness. The presumption is that receipts from these taxes
would go to general revenue, although they need not equal the damage—however defined—
that they seek to limit or avert.”).
56. Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 168.
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that implementation and execution of the contingent capital approach had
to be ironed out and understood before it was feasible. 57
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE P URPOSE AND DESIGN OF CONTINGENT
CONVERTIBLE BONDS
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, banks faced pressure to
satisfy regulatory capital requirements and sought ways to boost Tier 1
capital as mandated by increased regulatory requirements. 58 CoCo
bonds, otherwise known as AT1s, are hybrid securities that were designed
to meet this need by absorbing loss through imposing the brunt of
institutional failure on the investors that have purchased the CoCo
bonds.59 The two main features of CoCo bonds is the generation of
additional common equity capital to strengthen a firm’s ability to absorb
losses on its balance sheet and to improve incentives for management to
raise capital when needed. 60 These hybrid capital securities absorb losses
when the capital of the issuing bank falls below a certain level. 61 Unlike
a judicial or administrative restructuring proceeding, contingent capital
instruments are designated in advance to convert only under a pre-defined
set of contractual conditions.62 The event of capital falling below a
certain level “triggers” the bonds where the bonds either automatically
convert into equity—a debt-for-equity conversion—or the nominal value
gets written off—a principal write-down. 63 Upon the trigger event—
ideally before the institution runs too low on cash—the bonds’ conversion
then flips the switch so that rather than the bank owing its bondholders
money, the bondholders own shares of the bank. 64

57. Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 168.
58. STEFAN AVDJIEV ET AL., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS QUARTERLY REVIEW, COCOS:

A PRIMER 47 (2013), http://www.euromoney.com/Media/documents/shared/euromoney/r
_qt1309f.pdf (“Over time, as banks felt more pressure from markets and regulators to boost
their Tier 1 capital, they started to issue CoCos with trigger levels at or above the preset
minimum for satisfying the going-concern contingent capital requirement.”).
59. Id. at 43.
60. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 5.
61. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 43.
62. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 192–93.
63. MICHAEL SCHMID, CREDIT S UISSE, INVESTING IN CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLES 9
(2014), https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/am/docs/asset_management/events/2014/fits20
14-program/4-2-schmid-contingent-convertibles.pdf.
64. Williams-Grut, supra note 1.
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This design was intended to create a prophylactic effect of
heightened market discipline on CoCo bondholders so as to avoid
shareholder dilution and the potential of bearing economic loss. 65 Ideally,
issued CoCo bonds would have trigger levels at or above the present
minimum Tier 1 capital requirement in order to satisfy the going-concern
contingent capital requirement.66 Such a design intends to incentivize
banks to maintain higher ratios of true economic capital relative to its
risky assets as management would raise capital in a timely manner such
that dilutive conversions never occur.67 The implication and design is
that “too big to fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to
approach the point of insolvency.68
In the capital structure of a bank, AT1 CoCo bonds are junior
bank debt, sitting directly ahead of common equity capital and ranked
below subordinated debt.69 As “junior” debt, CoCo bonds are not as
secure as other bonds issued and would be of a lower priority in case of
a default.70 However, CoCo bonds make up for their risky position in the
capital structure in providing a significant return advantage—their
returns, especially from more developed market issuers, by and large
trump those on other forms of bank debt. 71 This is the instrument’s

65. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 7 (“[The] potential for the
contingent capital instrument holders to bear economic loss, along with the accompanying
dilution of the existing common equity holders, could provide incentive to both existing
holders of common shares and holders of contingent capital instruments to more closely
monitor the risk and financial performance of the issuer, thus providing additional market
discipline on the issuer’s behavior.”).
66. Jeffery, supra note 2.
67. See Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, How to Design a Contingent
Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 25 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 39, 44–45 (2013) (arguing that CoCos would prevent banks from reaching
insolvency by recapitalizing long before that point and would resolve the “too-big-to-fail”
problem).
68. See id. (discussing the efficacy of CoCo designs as providing strong incentive to
strengthen risk management and take remedial measures to raise equity well before they face
a substantial risk of insolvency).
69. Cocos & AT1’s – What, Who and Where?, MACRO & CREDIT M ARKET VIEWS BLOG
(Feb. 19, 2016) http://creditmacro.blogspot.com/2016/02/cocos-at1s-what-who-andwhere.html (illustrating where CoCo bonds/AT1s sit in the capital structure and the four types
of bond structures and the different outcomes for investors should the banks’ capital fall below
a pre-defined trigger level).
70. Jenny Cosgrave, Do We Need to Worry About CoCo Bonds?, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/10/do-we-need-to-worry-about-coco-bonds.html (discussing
the volatility and liquidity concerns surrounding CoCo bonds by highlighting Deutsche
Bank’s ability to make coupon payments).
71. Id.
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selling point, making up for its comparatively high risk. 72 To illustrate
the high-yield characteristic of CoCo bonds, the expected return on CoCo
bonds is currently 5% to 7%, whereas European high-yield bonds are
offering approximately 4%.73 Unsurprisingly, CoCo bonds are the
riskiest debt issued by banks. 74 Indeed, only a quarter of the CoCo bonds
in the Eurozone market are judged investment-grade by credit agency
Fitch.75 Accordingly, retail investors are restricted from involvement in
certain jurisdictions, such as in the United Kingdom. 76
The pricing of CoCo bonds in primary markets is consistent with
the proximity to the trigger point. 77 The lower the trigger point, the lower
the loss-absorbing capacity the CoCo bonds will have. 78 Consequently,
the CoCo bonds with low triggers will be less expensive to issue. 79
However, due to regulatory pressures, banks began issuing CoCo bonds
with trigger levels at or above the present minimum for satisfying the
going-concern contingent capital requirement. 80 As a result, the volume
of CoCo bonds classified as AT1 capital has increased since the start of
2012.81 In more recent years, however, the largest category of CoCo
bonds issued by trigger level falls within conversion at the point of nonviability (“PONV”), which is effectively gone-concern capital.82
72. SCHMID, supra note 63, at 13.
73. SCHMID, supra note 63, at 13.
74. Thomas Hale & Dan McCrum, Why CoCo Bonds are Worrying Investors, FIN. TIMES

(Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/b75b285c-cf07-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef99c77
(examining reasons why investors might be worried about buying CoCos, such as issuers’
missing coupon payments and concern regarding receiving initial investments back if
regulators are prohibiting banks from issuing new bonds in order to pay back investors).
75. Id.
76. Id. The Financial Conduct Authority formalized its ban on the sale of CoCos to retail
investors, making permanent the temporary ban it had set in place in October 2014. In its
policy statement released in June 2015 announcing the decision, the FCA highlighted the
complex terms of the bonds, such as issuer’s discretion on conversion, timing, effect on
pricing, currency exchange rate, and conversion rate as risk factors that it found challenging
for investors to model and price. Matthew Jeynes, FCA Confirms Retail Distribution Ban on
CoCo Bonds, FTADVISER (June 12, 2015), https://www.ftadviser.com/2015/06/12/
investments/fixed-income/fca-confirms-retail-distribution-ban-on-coco-bondsAGzo0OTRGQhJpiOUKZ5t7L/article.html.
77. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51.
78. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51.
79. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51–52.
80. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 47.
81. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 47.
82. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. In other words, when conversion is at
a point of gone-concern capital, the institution is either at or nearing liquidation state, whereas
conversion at a going concern rate means the trigger point is pre-set at a higher capital ratio
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By the same token, CoCo bond yields are mainly determined by
the instrument’s trigger mechanism and the loss-absorption
mechanism—that is, whether loss is absorbed through a debt-to-equity
conversion, or a write-down in value. 83 The trigger is bifurcated by
whether it is a mechanical or discretionary trigger, and if mechanical,
whether determination of the trigger point is accounting-based or marketbased.84 One model—the discretionary model—is favored by the Basel
Committee and assigns decision-making authority in trigger conversion
to the issuer’s primary regulator.85 This means that while the
convertibility is subject to contract, the regulator ultimately has the
discretion to determine the conditions triggering the convertibility upon
the regulator finding that the issuer’s financial condition is
unsatisfactory, 86 or trigger the write-down, effectively declaring the
CoCo bonds at a PONV.87 Another model bases trigger conversion on
the adequacy of the issuer’s capital ratios.88 A third model takes into
account market-based variables, such as the issuer’s share price and credit
spreads, to determine when the instruments convert. 89 The latter two
models are mechanical-based trigger models, distinguishable from the
first, discretion-based model described. 90 The choice of trigger can be
divided along several dimensions: high trigger (going concern) or low

such that liquidation is not a significant likelihood in the near future. See GLASSERMAN &
PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5 (“By far the largest category, measured either in dollars or by
number of banks issuing, specifies conversion at the point of non-viability, which is decidedly
gone-concern capital.”); see also Business Dictionary, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://
www.businessdictionary.com/definition/gone-concern.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2017)
(defining “gone concern”).
83. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51–52.
84. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.
85. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 192.
86. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 192–93. Discretionary triggers are otherwise known as
“point of non-viability” triggers. In particular, supervisors can activate the loss absorption
mechanism if they believe that such action is necessary to prevent the CoCo-issuing bank’s
insolvency. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BRIEFING: CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES, IS A
STORM BREWING? 4 (May 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/
2016/582011/EPRS_BRI(2016)582011_EN.pdf (summarizing the history of CoCos, their
main characteristics, pros and cons, and recent developments in a briefing by the European
Parliamentary Research Service).
87. See BONDADVISER, supra note 2 (describing that the European Central Bank deemed
Banco Popular likely to fail, triggering the point-of-non-viability, writing down all existing
shares, and canceling all AT1 instruments).
88. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 193.
89. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 193.
90. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 193.
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trigger (gone concern).91 Moreover, the loss absorption mechanism is
characterized by either a conversion to equity or a principal write-down
as aforementioned. 92 In the case of CoCo bonds that get written down,
some CoCo bonds may be written down permanently, while others get
written down temporarily—to be revived if the bank’s capital ratio rises
again.93 If temporary, the write down is generally reversed if the issuer’s
financial condition improves.94 Further, the write-off may be complete
or partial.95 If partial, only the amount needed to restore the issuing
bank’s regulatory capital ratio above the trigger point converts is written
down. 96
Therefore, CoCo bonds are multi-dimensional instruments, in
which all aspects of the instruments’ trigger design factor into the price
of CoCo bonds as well as what and how much of a yield investors receive
from CoCo bonds.97 This is just one area of concern surrounding the
effectiveness of CoCo bonds in absorbing loss and delivering on return
to investors.
Finally, CoCo bonds have no maturity date, 98 meaning that an
investor may never get his or her money back. 99 Thus, the bonds are
perpetual, although issuing banks do have the right to exercise a call
option to repurchase the bonds, but not without prior supervisory
approval, and only after a minimum of five years.100 Any repayment of

91. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.
92. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 46.
93. David Turner, Yield-Hungry Investors Take Their Chances with CoCo Bonds,

INSTITUTIONAL INV’R (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3402054
/banking-and-capital-markets-banking/yield-hungry-investors-take-their-chances-with-cocobonds.html#.WbmJUoqQyRs (discussing the high-risk nature of CoCos and the investor
uncertainty due to regulators’ unpredictable discretionary actions to hike risk weights of
assets).
94. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 7.
95. SCHMID, supra note 63, at 9.
96. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 8. Alternatively, the terms of
the instrument could specify a fixed amount of a conversion, write off, or write down upon
activation of the trigger. Id.
97. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51–52 (discussing different determinants of CoCo
pricing).
98. Wolf Richter, Deutsche Bank’s CoCo Bonds Speak of Fear of the Worst, WOLF
STREET, Sept. 16, 2016, https://wolfstreet.com/2016/09/16/deutsche-bank-unglued-again-coco-bonds-shares-plunge/ (explaining the impact of regulatory fines imposed on Deutsche
Bank in 2016 on Deutsche’s CoCo bondholders and how the panic shed light on
characteristics of the hybrid debt instrument).
99. Id.
100. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 16.
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principal also requires supervisory approval. 101 Furthermore, unlike
typical bonds, annual coupon payments—or interest payments—are
contingent on the bank’s ability to maintain its capital above required
levels and if its capital should fall below that threshold, the bank can
exercise the option not to make the coupon payment. 102 As such, coupon
payments are discretionary, and once skipped, do not get repaid at a later
date.103 This is where the “bail in” aspect kicks in: investors can
potentially “absorb” losses via missed coupon payments, and if
conversion is triggered, they become shareholders by virtue of a debt-toequity conversion. 104 Otherwise, the CoCo bonds are canceled entirely if
regulators deem the bank is failing. 105
IV. BANCO POPULAR’S WIPEOUT AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF COCO BONDS IN ABSORBING LOSS AND
RESCUING FAILING INSTITUTIONS
A.

Inadequacy of a Conversion

The effectiveness of CoCo bonds in saving an institution from
failure appears to be thwarted by the instrument’s conversion capacity.106
Once triggered, a conversion of AT1 capital into equity may not be
adequate. 107 Total regulatory capital consists of Tier 1 capital, which

101. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 16.
102. Richter, supra note 98 (“When CoCos plunge, it’s a sign investors think those

thresholds are approaching, that the bank will have to raise more capital by issuing shares
and/or CoCos. But with both plunging, raising capital that way will be prohibitively
expensive. So skipping CoCo coupon payments might be the next step to avoid, or delay,
falling over the bank. That’s what the market is afraid of.”).
103. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 16 (stipulating that the
bank must have full discretion at all times to cancel distributions and payments, which means
the payments are extinguished such that banks are not required to make distributions and
payments in kind).
104. Richter, supra note 98.
105. Richter, supra note 98.
106. See Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 166 (“[C]ontingent capital is not adequate even
for containment of ex post distress in all contingencies, especially in the form it is proposed
whereby there will be a one-time conversion of part of a firm’s debt into equity. If instead,
and depending on how deteriorated the conditions are, there was a requirement of progressive
conversion of debt into equity all the way down the capital structure of financial firms, then
indeed all firm losses could eventually be passed on to creditors.”).
107. See Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 166 (articulating the numerous shortfalls
associated with CoCo bond conversion).

2018]

INVESTORS’ TRASH, TAXPAYERS’ TREASURE

419

includes CET1 and AT1, as well as Tier 2 capital. 108 The Basel
Committee describes Tier 1 capital as “going concern” capital—capital
that takes the first and proportionately greatest share of any losses as they
occur.109 Tier 2, on the other hand, is the supplementary component of
bank capital and provides loss absorption on a “gone concern.”110 Thus,
AT1 comprises of only one component in a bank’s capital structure.111
As such, the amounts of contingent capital are not sufficiently large to
rescue a bank that is truly at the brink of insolvency, as the converted
CoCo bonds present only a sliver of a firm’s capital reserves. 112
Instead, a progressive conversion of debt into equity all the way
down the capital structure of the financial institution is more plausible in
absorbing the firm’s losses to be passed on to creditors.113 Since AT1
capital is made up of subordinated and perpetual Tier 1 capital
instruments issued by a bank that are not included in CET1, the
contingent conversion would thus only result in converted equity that
falls within this category of an entire firm’s total capital.114 However,
even if CoCo bonds were issued with the capacity to convert beyond a
designated portion of a financial institution’s debt capital structure,115
CoCo bonds are still limited in the amount of support they can provide to
an ailing firm to the value of CoCo bonds that are actually issued and
outstanding.116 Therefore, CoCo bonds, as issued in their current form,
will probably not be effective or significantly prevent a bank from
failing. 117

108. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12.
109. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 14.
110. CADWALADER, supra note 37, at 3; See also Tier 2 Capital, INVESTOPEDIA, http://

www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tier2capital.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2017) (defining Tier 2
capital).
111. Jeffery, supra note 2.
112. See Jeffery, supra note 2 (explaining that contingent capital is comprised of only AT1
capital and that total regulatory capital consists of not just Tier 1 capital, but also Tier 2
capital).
113. See Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 166 (“[C]ontingent capital is not adequate even
for containment of ex post distress in all contingencies, especially in the form it is proposed
whereby there will be a one-time conversion of part of a firm’s debt into equity.”).
114. See Jeffery, supra note 2 (describing what comprises AT1 capital).
115. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 195.
116. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 195.
117. See Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 166 (arguing that a one-time conversion would
be ineffective for containment of distress).
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Flaws to the Trigger Point

Second, the trigger design—arguably the most essential element
as it kick-starts the CoCo bond’s converting function—varies greatly
among CoCo bonds issued. 118 Whether the contingent capital will
convert in times of financial stress turns on the choice of the capital-ratio
trigger: the triggering event defining the point when the CoCo bonds will
convert from debt into equity, or alternatively, when the nominal value,
or principal, is written down. 119
The capital-ratio as related to CoCo bond triggers is the
comparison between a bank’s core equity capital and its total riskweighted assets.120 Under the requirements of Basel III, Tier 1 capital
instruments must provide for a “going-concern” write-down of principal
or conversion into equity at a pre-specified trigger point.121 Yet, to date,
out of the distribution of Tier 1 CoCo bonds by trigger level, the largest
category—more than 95% of CoCo bonds issued—fall at a conversion
point of non-viability, according to Moody’s database.122 This is
alarming as an instrument converting at a PONV trigger point is
effectively bail-in debt, meaning the institution is at or near a point of
insolvency and bondholders will have to take a loss on their holdings. 123
The smallest category of CoCo bonds issued fall within conversion at a
high trigger—a Tier 1 capital ratio of 7% or higher.124 This suggests that
the bulk of presently issued CoCo bonds will not fulfill their prophylactic
role in preventing risk ahead of default and creates an impression of a

118. See AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 44 (discussing that CoCos can have one or more
triggers and describing how the loss absorption of the CoCo can be activated once any trigger
is breached).
119. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.
120. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12 (defining capital and
components of capital and requiring that specific components of an institution’s capital be a
certain percentage of risk-weighted assets at all times).
121. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12, 17 (defining goingconcern Tier 1 Capital as including AT1 capital and that the instruments must absorb loss
upon breaching a pre-specified trigger point); see also E IGER ET AL., supra note 3 (elaborating
on the Basel III framework and its criteria that the Tier 1 instruments must be capable of
principal loss absorption at a pre-specified trigger point).
122. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.
123. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.
124. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. Moody’s CoCo Monitor shows 19
banks issue CoCos at a higher trigger level of 7%-8%, 37 banks issue CoCos at a trigger level
of 4.5%-5.5%, and finally, 109 banks issue CoCos that trigger at the PONV (Note: no U.S.
banks issue CoCos). GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.
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general failure of the equity component of CoCo bond debt by way of
going concern conversion.125 Higher, not lower, CoCo bond triggers are
ideal as higher triggers while the institution is still a going-concern would
reduce bank risk-taking as the capital instrument is still viable. 126 Thus,
higher triggers provide additional equity capital at earlier intervention
points.127 On the other hand, a low trigger, such as the trigger point with
which 95% of today’s CoCo bonds are issued as mentioned above, is a
gone concern trigger, meaning the CoCo bonds convert at the PONV. 128
Thus, such low trigger CoCo bonds have lower loss-absorbing
capacity. 129
The high proportion of low-trigger CoCo bonds to going concern
CoCo bonds may be attributable to the fact that authorities are generally
reluctant to trigger conversion. 130 An instrument with a discretionary
trigger is less likely to convert, as discretionary triggers give the bank’s
national regulator supervisory discretion to determine when the issuer has
reached the PONV. 131 Indeed, issuance of CoCo bonds with a
discretionary trigger, rather than a mechanical trigger, are more
commonplace. 132 Currently, worldwide issuance with discretionary
triggers exceeds issuance with strictly mechanical triggers. 133 This trend
weakens the original purpose of CoCo bonds as the greater portion of
these instruments being issued according to discretion-based triggers
means there are likely more “unconvertible” CoCo bonds than
convertible, even in the event of banks hitting low capital ratios. 134
Indeed, a common investor concern regarding discretionary triggers is the

125. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.
126. See AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51 (“All else the same, CoCos with relatively

low triggers offer more favourable terms to holders of CoCos than to equity holders since the
trigger is less likely to be breached and the former group is less likely to absorb losses. By
contrast . . . equity holders prefer high-trigger CoCos since they are more likely to lead to
early loss absorption by holders of CoCos.”).
127. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, UNDERSTANDING CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE
SECURITIES: A PRIMER 2 (2016), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016
/Understanding_Contingent_Convertible_Securities-A_Primer.pdf (explaining what CoCos
are, their product characteristics, issuance to date, credit ratings, and recent developments).
128. SCHMID, supra note 63, at 7.
129. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 47.
130. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6.
131. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2.
132. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6.
133. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6.
134. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6.
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difficulty in predicting the regulator’s use of its discretion.135 Certainly,
regulatory discretion is always potentially subject to insufficient
information, ineffective monitoring and political pressures. 136
To investors, safer bonds are characterized by a greater distance
between the CoCo bond’s trigger point and a bank’s threshold level in
CET1 ratio. 137 The trigger should ideally be set at a high enough capital
ratio level so that in a trigger event, the issuing bank is still fully viable. 138
However, under a discretionary trigger, the bank’s national regulator will
call the trigger only upon its determination that the issuing bank has
reached the PONV. 139 Therefore, there is a strong argument for trigger
levels to be determined by a mechanical trigger, rather than by
supervisory discretion. 140 Yet, the real difference between mechanical
and discretionary triggers may not be significant, as a mechanical trigger
still requires an explicit agreement of a bank’s regulator, rendering the
automatic trigger a de facto discretionary regulatory decision. 141
Practically speaking, then, the two types of triggers are indistinguishable,
as automatic conversion can only occur once a bank admits to failing to
satisfy the minimal capital ratio requirement. 142
Even assuming the mechanical trigger approach is pursued,
calculating the trigger point of capital requires either an accounting-based
or a market-based approach.143 A market-based trigger takes into account

135. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2; see HENNING HESSE, COCO
BONDS AND RISK: THE MARKET VIEW 2 (2016) (“[I]nvestors value CoCo bonds higher when
the distance to the trigger is high. This shows two things: First, investors are well aware of
one of the key risk in CoCo bonds. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it supports the
view that investors think that an automatic trigger event is plausible, rather than thinking that
a CoCo bond will only be triggered on regulator’s discretion (for example in a bail-in).”).
136. Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang; On the Design of Contingent Capital with a
Market Trigger, 70 J. FIN. 881, 883 (discussing the controversial debate over the proper design
of the trigger component of contingent convertible bonds, namely, whether triggers should be
determined by accounting ratios, regulatory discretion, or bank management).
137. HESSE, supra note 135, at 7.
138. EIGER ET AL., supra note 30 (describing the process of setting the trigger point as a
“delicate balancing act.”).
139. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2.
140. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6.
141. See GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6 (discussing that the distinction
between discretionary and automatic triggers may be tenuous in practice as automatic
conversion can only occur once a bank admits it has failed to satisfy the minimum capital
requirement).
142. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6.
143. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.
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a bank’s share price or its credit default swap spread. 144 An accountingbased trigger is activated if the institution’s capital ratio drops below a
specified level. 145 An accounting-based trigger is a more backward
looking approach and may be impractical in its ability to forecast the
future evolution of the issuing bank’s capital ratio.146 Nevertheless,
regulators have resisted including any sort of market signal in a CoCo
bond conversion trigger, and to date, no issued CoCo bond utilizes a
market-based trigger.147 The consequence of an accounting-based trigger
without consideration for market information might lead to the possibility
of even a high-trigger CoCo bond converting too late to provide goingconcern capital if the regulatory accounting numbers fail to reflect the
bank’s true financial condition. 148
Indeed, bank failures may unfold too quickly for the bonds’ loss
mechanisms to kick in. 149 The lag resulting from accounting-based
triggers may be one explanation to Banco Popular’s recent CoCo bond
wipeout. 150 Banco Popular had a total market capitalization of €4 billion
at the start of 2017, but was forcibly acquired by Spain’s largest bank,
Banco Santander SA—just as Popular came close to a collapse from bad
property loans—for just €1 in an overnight auction after the European
Central Bank (“ECB”) deemed Popular “failing or likely to fail” in June
2017.151 This was the first time that CoCo bonds have been wiped out.152

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6.
NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2.
NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2.
GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6.
See NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2 (“For CoCos with
accounting-based triggers, it may be difficult to forecast the evolution of the issuer’s capital
ratio.”).
149. Neil Unmack, Going Going Gone, REUTERS : BREAKING VIEWS, June 7, 2017, https:/
/www.breakingviews.com/considered-view/popular-wipeout-leaves-coco-bonds-ondrawing-board/ (explaining why Banco Popular’s wipeout shows CoCo bonds’ value did not
provide the expected results while highlighting that contagion of investor panic was contained
which might show that Popular was an isolated case).
150. See id. (“One conclusion could be that CoCos are redundant, as bank failures happen
too quickly for the bonds’ intricate loss mechanisms to swing into action.”).
151. Tom Beardsworth, How Spain’s Zombie Bank Rescue Snares Bondholders:
QuickTake Q&A, BLOOMBERG, June 7, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-06-07/how-spain-s-zombie-bank-rescue-snares-bondholders-quicktake-q-a
(summarizing the Santander-Banco Popular takeover and why Banco Popular’s junior bonds
and Tier 1 (CoCo bonds) were completely written off); see also BONDADVISER, supra note 2
(“[T]he ECB deemed Banco Popular as ‘failing or likely to fail’ and sold the bank to its rival
Banco Santander for €1 in an overnight auction conducted by the Single Resolution Board.”).
152. Beardsworth, supra note 151.
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Specifically, Banco Popular’s CoCo bonds were wiped out before they
even triggered. 153 Regulators had deemed the bonds non-viable before
reaching the trigger point. 154 Nonetheless, before news of the Santander
takeover, Popular’s CoCo bonds—a total of €1.25 billion worth of AT1
bonds—were still trading at around 50% of face value, suggesting a high
probability of loss, but still not at the point of a wipeout.155 Further, the
bonds issued by Popular consisted of €750 million of CoCo bonds that
were due to be converted into equity when its CET1 ratio dropped below
7%, and another €500 million that would convert at 5.125%.156 Thus,
Popular issued CoCo bonds with patently conservative, Basel IIIcompliant trigger points, and yet their non-viability before reaching the
trigger points indicated a lag in the instruments’ ability to react to
institutional failure in a timely manner. 157 Due to Popular’s lack of
liquidity and inability to meet short term obligations, ECB stepped in and
called for the trigger of the bonds as at a PONV. 158
Therefore, Popular demonstrates that a financial institution’s
reported capital levels are more ambiguous than useful for investors. 159
Bank failures are typically attributable to a sudden shortage of liquidity
rather than capital. 160 Indeed, despite what the reported CET1 ratios for
Popular may have been prior to the Santander acquisition, some models
suggest that Popular’s real CET1 at the time of its resolution was negative
2%, as implied by the write-downs made by Santander.161 Thus, Popular
could serve as a cautionary tale that when a bank faces crises, its capital
levels are not only misleading in providing a sense of security, but have
minimal utility for investors. 162 Popular demonstrated that while its

153.
154.
155.
156.

Unmack, supra note 149.
Unmack, supra note 149.
Unmack, supra note 149.
Matei Rosca, CoCo Calculations Change as Flops Bring Bank Risks to Forefront,
S&P GLOBAL, Aug. 3, 2017 (discussing that the outcome of CoCo bonds by way of Banco
Popular and BremerLB have shown them to be riskier than analysts have perceived).
157. See Unmack, supra note 149 (“The Spanish lender’s failure and rescue by rival
Santander did not provide the expected test for bonds which convert into equity under stress:
the securities were wiped out before they could be triggered.”).
158. BONDADVISER, supra note 2.
159. Rosca, supra note 156.
160. Unmack, supra note 149.
161. Rosca, supra note 156.
162. Rosca, supra note 156.
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market capitalization indicated value to investors, 163 it in reality
encountered a liquidity crisis and subsequently could not pay off the debt
instruments.164
More importantly, Popular’s wipeout is revealing of the
unpredictable nature of discretionary triggers. 165 Popular’s issues
stemmed from its heaping pool of nonperforming loans made on the eve
of a housing crash, which took up a large portion of its capital buffers. 166
This led to the lack of liquidity which caused ECB to declare the bonds
non-viable, effectively canceling them. 167 Yet, up to that point, regulators
did not instruct it to stop making payments on its CoCo bonds despite
having broad discretion and in light of the bank nearing insolvency. 168
Fear of triggering runs and causing sudden shortages of liquidity are
likely to make executives and regulators apprehensive of taking any sort
of action that might undermine confidence, including canceling coupon
payments. 169 As it happens, regulators, in facilitating the Popular
acquisition, completely bypassed the pre-determined trigger points of 7%
and 5.125%,170 which were contractually set, for Popular’s bonds in order
to write off the bonds completely. 171 With no warning and not a single
coupon payment missed, bondholders and investors were arguably blind-

163. See Rosca, supra note 156 (“As Popular . . . demonstrated, a bank may have an
adequate capital ratio but still encounter a liquidity crunch that means it cannot pay the debt.”).
164. Rosca, supra note 156.
165. See Unmack, supra note 149 (discussing that regulators deemed Popular non-viable
before any of the trigger points in the CoCo bonds were reached); see also NERA ECONOMIC
CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2 (explaining that it may be difficult to predict regulators’
use of its discretion in triggering the CoCo bonds).
166. Lisa Abramowicz, The Untested $181 Billion Bank Safety Net, BLOOMBERG
QUICKTAKE, June 6, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-06-06/bancopopular-could-use-a-little-help-from-its-cocos (describing Banco Popular as an idiosyncratic
case and the arising uncertainties for a $181 billion pool of contingent convertible debt
globally).
167. Unmack, supra note 149.
168. Abramowicz, supra note 166; see also NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note
127, at 2 (“[E]ven when an issuer is able and willing to make interest payments on AT1
CoCos, it could be prevented from doing so by the regulator.”).
169. Unmack, supra note 149.
170. Rosca, supra note 156; JOHN KRIZ & JOE URCIUOLI, SPECTRUM ASSET MANAGEMENT,
BANCO POPULAR POST MORTEM : IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AT1 MARKET (2017), https://
www.samipfd.com/935220.pdf.
171. See BONDADVISER, supra note 1 (“ECB’s action stemmed from Popular’s lack of
liquidity (i.e. inability to meet short term obligations) and hence, the Point Of Non-Viability
(PONV) was triggered. As a result, all existing shares (Common Equity Tier 1) and
Additional Tier 1 (AT1) instruments were cancelled.”).
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sided, literally taking a loss overnight. 172 Given the unpredictability of
regulatory action and other previously mentioned factors such as political
pressures, 173 bonds such as those of Popular’s will continue to hold an
element of uncertainty and volatility.
Nonetheless, given the attenuated difference between mechanical
and discretionary triggers and the fact that they are de facto
indistinguishable, the search for a more dependable type of trigger is
likely futile and highlights an area of ambiguity in CoCo bonds that
should not be ignored.174
C.

Systemic Contagion

Even if CoCo bonds converted at its pre-specified trigger points
without regulatory action—before a bank’s true capital ratio renders the
bonds non-viable—conversion of the instruments may create incidental
damage aside from saving a failing institution. 175 The actual act of
conversion, once triggered, could spark or intensify contagion as existing
creditors and potential investors might interpret the conversion of
contingent capital into equity in one institution as a transmission signal
of fatal distress for their own institutions or for the financial system as a
whole. 176 Indeed, conversion of an institution’s CoCo bonds signals to
depositors that the institution’s asset quality has deteriorated.177 After all,
172. Beardsworth, supra note 151.
173. Analysts commented that authorities’ actions in stepping in to wind down Popular

and safeguard its assets gives the eurozone authorities new credibility after questions were
raised during a tortuous struggle to clean up Italy’s troubled banks. In June 2017, an
agreement to rescue Italian Monte dei Paschi di Siena bank came about, after close to 18
months of discussion over ways to restructure and bail out Italy’s weakest banks, during which
Bank of Italy governor criticized European banking authorities for “decision making
processes relatively incompatible with rapid intervention” and lack of effective coordination.
Tobias Buck, Santander Takes Over ‘Failing’ Rival Banco Popular After EU Steps In, FIN.
TIMES, June 7, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/4cf8a400-4b4b-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43;
see Alex Barker, Brussels and Rome Seal Rescue Deal for Monte dei Paschi, FIN. TIMES, June
1, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/3c6e3cb8-46ae-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996 (describing
the agreement to rescue Monte dei Paschi di Siena bank after drawn-out discussions regarding
the restructuring of the Italian bank, which includes both investor bail-in and injection of
capital using public funds approved by the EU).
174. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6 (discussing that the distinction between
discretionary and automatic triggers is tenuous in practice).
175. Smith, supra note 10.
176. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 194.
177. STEPHANIE C HAN & SWEDER VAN WIJNBERGEN, COCOS, CONTAGION AND SYSTEMIC
RISK 2 (2014), https://papers.tinbergen.nl/14110.pdf (analyzing how CoCo conversion leads
to higher systemic risk).
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these AT1 bonds should ideally convert only when the bank’s capital
ratio hits a certain point ahead of default. 178
However, the aftermath of the Popular trauma may have eased
concern that investors would panic when a CoCo bond wipes out, thus
creating a domino effect of contagion to other lenders. 179 After the
wipeout of the Popular bonds, there appeared to be little spillover into the
remainder of the market.180 Other AT1 securities were quickly buying
and selling at higher ranges, including debt issued by other Spanish banks
and one bank’s CoCo bonds—those of CaixaBank—were trading at
higher prices just hours after the demise of the Popular bonds. 181 As such,
the market rally after Popular’s wipeout signified containment of postwipeout “contagion.”182 Some argue that this was an indication of
healthy CoCo bond functionality and that the lack of contagion in
investor panic manifested the instrument’s success. 183
Lending credence to this argument, and ignoring the fact that the
bonds were completely canceled before Popular was acquired, regulators’
apparent reluctance to trigger a bail-in in Popular’s scenario still raises an
integral question: How effective of a buffer were $181 billion in CoCo
bonds?184 As long as bank assets are positively correlated, there remains
the possibility of a CoCo bond conversion in one bank leading to investor
panic in another bank. 185 As such, a CoCo bond conversion can create
negative externality, leading to investor anxiety, and greater likelihood of
bank runs by alarmed depositors. 186 Conversion inevitably signals to

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 57, at 46.
Smith, supra note 10.
Smith, supra note 10.
Smith, supra note 10.
Smith, supra note 10.
Smith, supra note 10.
Abramowicz, supra note 166.
CHAN & VAN WIJNBERGEN, supra note 177, at 46.
CHAN & VAN WIJNBERGEN, supra note 177, at 46. Even if a conversion has not been
triggered, the Basel Committee proposal on bail-ins limits bail-in conversion to noncommon
Tier 1 and Tier II capital instruments only. This may reduce the danger of setting off a run or
spreading contagion, since short-term debt would be protected, because short-term debt is
excluded from conversion being that it is not a capital instrument. However, limiting the
selection of bailable instruments to Tier I and Tier II capital only, could restrict the total
amount of capital potentially available to absorb losses, limiting the usefulness of bail-ins to
circumstances where institutional losses do not exceed existing capital. Short-term investors
who suspect that their issuer’s long-term debt and common equity are insufficient to facilitate
the recapitalization will expect to be impaired as well, and may run anyway. SCOTT, supra
note 48, at 197–98.
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depositors that asset quality has worsened and as a consequence, the
probability of a bank run likely goes up—the opposite outcome of what
CoCo bonds are designed to create. 187
In February of 2016, Deutsche Bank’s share price saw a dramatic
drop causing investors to flee the bank’s bonds, heeding warnings from
analysts that Deutsche Bank might not be able to afford interest payments
on its CoCo bonds.188 Indeed, the plunge in Deutsche Bank’s share price
created an adverse chain reaction amongst nervous investors, resulting in
a “self-feeding cycle of falling prices.”189 Some argue that unlike in
2016, when there was market fear of Deutsche Bank missing its coupon
payments, Banco Popular had less of a systemic reach than Deutsche
Bank in the size and scope of its operations. 190 But Deutsche Bank should
not serve as a security blanket supporting the view that Banco Popular’s
contagion containment is an isolated instance. 191 In the event of an actual
bank run, CoCo bonds will not satisfy systemic demand for liquidity,
therefore contingent capital can never serve as a useful tool for rescuing
financial institutions affected by contagion. 192 As such, a mass
conversion of the CoCo bonds of any significantly sized financial
institution should not be taken lightly, and in addition, regulators’
discretionary decisions to trigger bail-ins and continue allowance of
coupon payments offers little assurance to current and potential investors
that other institutions are not also undergoing financial stress. 193
187. CHAN & VAN WIJNBERGEN, supra note 177, at 3. In the United States, bank runs will
likely not be as much of a concern due to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”). The FDIC provides government-guaranteed deposit insurance and so depositors
have no incentive to start a run on the bank when they will not suffer losses when a bank fails,
provided that the bank has FDIC insurance. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 157.
188. Tim Wallace, German Finance Minister and Bank Chief Insist: Deutsche is ‘Rock
Solid’, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 9, 2016, 6:31 PM, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance
/newsbysector/banksandfinance/12148961/German-finance-minister-and-bank-chief-insistDeutsche-is-rock-solid.html (explaining the market panic induced by Deutsche Bank’s shares
falling in price and how it has compelled bank’s management to reassure investors that the
bank is still stable).
189. Id.
190. Abramowicz, supra note 166.
191. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 194 (discussing that conversion events might well
intensify contagion).
192. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 194.
193. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 194 (“Since contingent capital does not satisfy the
systemic demand for liquidity during a run, it can never serve as a useful tool for rescuing
financial institutions affected by contagion. Proponents of contingent capital instruments who
appreciate this limitation acknowledge the necessity of interim liquidity facilities, organized
privately or in all likelihood by a public lender of last resort to steward issuers through a
period of systemic crisis.”). The Deutsche AT1 incident subsided only after concerted action
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Inherent Risks to Investors

Finally, CoCo bonds carry a great deal of inherent risk for their
investors.194 CoCo bonds as a hybrid debt instrument are designed to
resemble equity by either automatically converting into equity or writing
off its face value upon a trigger event.195 Currently, there are more writedown CoCo bonds being issued than there are CoCo bonds that convert
to equity, according to Moody’s CoCo Monitor data.196 Both forms of
conversions technically reduce leverage and could thus act as a tool in
reducing risk taking, but overall there is no research consensus on the
merits of the two types of conversion structures as compared to each
other.197
In any case, the risky nature of CoCo bonds compels investors to
understand the form of loss absorption the CoCo bond takes on when the
trigger is reached. 198 Conversion into equity should, in principle, be a
better choice for investors as it would offer the possibility of value from
a stock investment,199 whereas the value of write-down CoCo bonds goes

by the bank’s management and decision to buy back its own bonds, as well as limitation of
its CoCos to institutional portfolios. However, its importance should not be minimized as the
cause of turmoil was uncertainty about receiving coupon payments and investors’ fear that
they would be holding perpetual bonds with no coupon payments forever—a possibility that
lies and continues to be at the discretion of the bank or the supervisors. EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, supra note 86, at 9.
194. See Beardsworth, supra note 151 (“Shareholders always lose when banks fail . . . .”).
195. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 1.
196. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 3. The issuance of write-down CoCo
bonds in Europe, the U.K., and in the Asia Pacific region substantially exceeds that of
convertible CoCos. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 3.
197. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 4. There is no distinction in the regulatory
treatment between conversion-to-equity and writedown CoCos, although some research
shows that issuing conversion-to-equity CoCos has a negative impact on issuer’s credit
default swap spreads, while issuing CoCos with a principal writedown has less of an impact.
STEFAN AVDJIEV ET AL., COCO BOND ISSUANCE AND BANK FUNDING COSTS 35 (2015)
[hereinafter COCO BOND ISSUANCE AND BANK FUNDING COSTS], https://bfi.uchicago.edu/
sites/default/files/research/Bolton_CoCos%202015-06-10%2C%20v2.pdf.
This
is
attributable to the fact that conversion to equity increases the cost of risk-taking for current
shareholders and management due to equity dilution. Id. at 28. Aside from the impact on
bank funding costs, however, there appears to be no regulatory distinction. Id. at 3. “Even
though principal writedown contracts have different incentive effects than equity-conversion
contracts, they are treated equally by regulators . . . [and] there are no theoretical analyses that
compare the two conversion mechanisms.” Id.
198. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 17 (stipulating that
loss-absorption must take the form of either a write-down mechanism or equity conversion).
199. See AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 46 (discussing the different conversion rates for
conversion-to-equity CoCo bondholders).
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to zero.200 However, CoCo bonds converting into equity results in
dilution of return for existing shareholders.201 This may lead to stronger
incentives for the financial institution to take cavalier actions in creating
stronger incentives for CoCo bond investors, such as gambling through
riskier, higher-return investments.202 On the other hand, investors of
write-down CoCo bonds would receive nothing upon reaching a trigger
point, just as in the Banco Popular wipeout. 203 Compared to equity
conversion, write-down CoCo bonds may be less disruptive but, in any
write-down scenario—whether a permanent write off or a temporary
write down—the investors still could face permanent loss if the bank’s
capital ratio never improves. 204 And as Banco Popular illustrates,
shareholders always lose when banks fail. 205 Banco Popular’s total
market capitalization was $4.5 billion at the beginning of 2017 and had
declined to zero by the time of its acquisition by Santander, as evidenced
by the €1 purchase price. 206 The investors in the CoCo bonds and Banco
Popular’s shareholders, in consequence, received nothing. 207 For
contingent capital instruments that result in permanent write-downs after
a triggering event, the write-off results in an increase in retained earnings
for the issuer and always a loss for the instrument holder. 208
Principal aside, coupon payments are another concern for CoCo
bond investors. Regulators may suspend or limit coupon payments if they
deem a bank’s capital to be nearing a certain threshold near or above the
trigger point, thereby affecting the bond’s principal.209 As briefly
200. Beardsworth, supra note 151.
201. COCO BOND ISSUANCE AND BANK FUNDING COSTS, supra note 197, at 28–29

(“Conversion to equity increases the cost of risk taking for current shareholders and
management due to equity dilution.”).
202. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 4.
203. Beardsworth, supra note 151.
204. See Beardsworth, supra note 151 (explaining how in Banco Popular’s acquisition,
bondholders received nothing as the bonds were written down completely, and Tier 2
holders—holders of junior notes—also received nothing from a conversion as Banco Popular
was sold for a nominal amount).
205. Beardsworth, supra note 151.
206. Beardsworth, supra note 151.
207. Beardsworth, supra note 151.
208. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 18. This is because rather than
having to issue common equity as the issuing bank would do under a debt-to-equity CoCo
conversion, the alternative feature of writing off the nominal value has the effect of
extinguishing the issuing bank’s outstanding debt entirely. As such, the amount of lossabsorption could be equal to the full face amount of the instrument. FIN. STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 18.
209. Turner, supra note 93.
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mentioned earlier, the 2016 market scare revolving around whether
Deutsche Bank would be able to pay its coupons on its CoCo bonds as it
approached the threshold for required capital showcased investor
confusion and frenzy arising from uncertainty over CoCo bonds. 210 As
Deutsche Bank’s shares plunged in late 2016, hitting a three-decade low,
its €1.75 billion bond’s falling price induced a panic among investors
over whether Deutsche Bank would be skipping CoCo bond coupon
payments. 211 But even if coupon or principal payments were not missed,
this is likely not a reliable indicator of an institution’s safety and
soundness. 212 None of Banco Popular’s AT1 bonds had incurred losses
for investors, either in terms of missed principal or coupon payments. 213
Yet, the bonds’ real price dropped to zero at the call of the authorities. 214
All in all, to absorb loss, CoCo bonds must be responsive to the
health of an institution, so the coupon payments are optional and the
bonds themselves are perpetual.215 This means CoCo bonds will not
mature unless the bank exercises an option, which is typically after five
years.216 While investors’ early presumptions may have been that banks
would almost always take up the option to redeem its CoCo bonds,
regulators may not allow banks to exercise the option to redeem the bonds
if its low capital ratio requires having to issue new bonds at higher
costs. 217 Therefore, for investors, this means the risk of losing their initial
investment in addition to missed coupon payments never really goes
away. 218

210. Richter, supra note 98.
211. Frances Coppola, Deutsche Bank: A Sinking Ship?, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2016), https://

www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2016/09/27/deutsche-bank-a-sinking-ship/
#367d72873805 (emphasizing the impending trouble Deutsche Bank was in, leading to
worries that the bank would be unable to pay its coupons or that the bonds would have to be
bailed in).
212. See Smith, supra note 10 (discussing that while no Banco Popular CoCo bonds had
ever incurred losses for investors prior to the wipeout, the bonds’ real price was at one point,
“zero”).
213. See Smith, supra note 10 (“No AT1 bond has yet incurred losses for investors, either
in terms of missed principal or coupon payments.”).
214. Hale & McCrum, supra note 74.
215. Hale & McCrum, supra note 74.
216. Hale & McCrum, supra note 74.
217. Hale & McCrum, supra note 74.
218. See Turner, supra note 93 (“[I]nvestors have to rely not only on the issuer’s
performing well but also on the favorability of ‘exogenous factors’ such as a lack of
‘regulatory intrusion’ . . . .”).
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Moreover, regulators’ discretionary involvement creates yet
another area of uncertainty and poses as an exogenous factor to
investors.219 As previously mentioned, what currently triggers a CoCo
bond’s conversion, whether it be a principal write-down or an equity
conversion, depends on the capital ratio of the institution. 220 Regulatory
behavior may well affect the calculation of the institution’s capital
ratio.221 Indeed, regulators may raise the risk weightings of assets which
could effectively cut a bank’s capital ratio, even if the bank’s capital
remains stable.222 With this additional wild card factor for investors, the
risks CoCo bonds pose to its holders render more confusion and hassle
than the high-yields—if any yield at all—are worth. 223
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The current landscape for CoCo bonds is one without a global
consensus.224 If CoCo bonds remain as an avenue to rescue failing
institutions, international coordination will be required to ensure
institutions have an equal competitive landscape so that regulatory
arbitrage is averted.225 Reform in the trigger system may be most
palpable in refining the efficacy of the CoCo bond instrument in
absorbing loss.226 A rule-based system-wide trigger as opposed to an
institutional-level trigger would more likely address systemic risktaking.227 A rule-based trigger allows for anticipation, whereas a trigger
event at the discretion of regulators would likely produce adverse news
219.
220.
221.
222.

Turner, supra note 93.
See supra Part IV.B.
Turner, supra note 93.
Turner, supra note 93. Regulators in recent years have increased the risk weightings
of assets. Doing so will reduce a bank’s capital ratio, even if a bank’s capital remains stable.
In 2014, regulators did just that with Danske Bank: raising the risk weights due to the
Copenhagen bank’s mortgage loans from 2013 cut its capital ratio by more than a percentage
point. Turner, supra note 93.
223. See Turner, supra note 93 (describing the role regulators have played in the past as
perceived by investors as a “sudden-death quality” and making investors wary).
224. Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 144.
225. Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 144; see INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC.,
supra note 18 (indicating that some of the most significant changes of Basel III have yet to be
implemented and that there is “still some way to go.”).
226. See GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 4 (making note of academic research
advocating for different trigger mechanisms); see also STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH,
REWRITING FINANCIAL REGULATION 42 (2009), http://govtpolicyrecs.stern.nyu.edu/docs/w
hitepapers_ebook_chapter_9.pdf (advocating for a rule-based reform to the trigger system).
227. NIEUWERBURGH, supra note, at 43.
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and an information contagion to the market, causing a downward
spiral.228 Further, the required capitalization below which conversion is
triggered should be measured based on market measures of equity, rather
than book measures of equity.229 Accounting-based measures, as
previously mentioned, often lag in reflecting the true capitalization of
firms, which is the most likely explanation behind Banco Popular’s
wipeout. 230
Until this fundamental change to the conversion trigger is made
to CoCo bonds, they will continue to be exotic, impractical instruments
for investors.231 But most importantly, the bonds will be ineffective in
rescuing troubled institutions without government or public
intervention. 232
VI. CONCLUSION
The demise of Banco Popular reveals the true characteristics of
CoCo bonds when put to the test. Banco Popular’s takeover was the first
time the hybrid debt instruments wiped out, revealing both the bonds’
ability to absorb loss as required by international regulatory standards,
but not without the expense of bondholders through unpredictable lossabsorption mechanisms. 233 The bonds demonstrated first and foremost
the inadequacy of conversion to wholly rescue a bank from failure.
Second, Banco Popular shed light on the complex trigger system, how
228.
229.
230.
231.

NIEUWERBURGH, supra note, at 43.
NIEUWERBURGH, supra note, at 43.
NIEUWERBURGH, supra note, at 43.
See Alexander Weber & Boris Groendahl, EU Bank-Disposal Chief Koenig Defends
Handling of Banco Popular, BLOOMBERG (July 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2017-07-07/bank-disposal-chief-says-italy-aid-shows-flaws-in-failure-rules
(discussing that head of the euro area’s bank-failure authority rejected allegations that the
agency’s actions accelerated the collapse of Banco Popular and that many of Popular’s junior
bondholders were questioning the transparency of the resolution). Pacific Investment
Management Co., Anchorage Capital Group, Algebris Investments and Ronit Capital are
among investors seeking to challenge the forced write down of AT1 and Lower Tier 2 bonds.
Katie Linsell & Tom Beardsworth, Wiped-Out Banco Popular Creditors Kept Waiting for
Swap Payout, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201708-16/banco-popular-swaps-payout-delay-shows-snag-in-market-overhaul (reporting that
wiped-out Banco Popular’s bondholders have been delayed in their waiting and will continue
to wait for payouts on credit-default swaps due to a valuation of what Popular’s junior
creditors may be owed before derivatives contracts insuring those notes pay out, as announced
by the International Swaps & Derivatives Association’s Determinations Committee).
232. BONDADVISER, supra note 2.
233. See supra, Part IV.B.
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regulator discretion impacted the loss-absorption process, and the futility
of any reform in the same. Further, an ex post accounting of Banco
Popular’s capital levels revealed the delay of the bonds’ loss-absorption
mechanisms. 234 Finally, the optional coupon payments, permanent writedowns, unpredictable regulatory behavior, and possibility of contagion
are aspects of CoCo bonds that create unavoidable, incidental risks to
investors. On the other hand, the Banco Popular investors’ losses can be
viewed as a win for taxpayers as the sale of Banco Popular was facilitated
without bail-out assistance. 235
The €1 buyout, while disappointingly insignificant to investors,
is arguably priceless for taxpayers that may have had to fund Banco
Popular’s rescue were it not for the bonds being written down. Although
not quite junk bonds, CoCo bonds may have proven to be investors’ trash,
but as it turns out, taxpayers’ treasure.
JOANNE WU*

234. See Rosca, supra note 156 (“[F]or a bank facing crisis, the capital level might even
mislead investors by providing a false sense of security. [M]odeling suggested that Popular’s
real CET1 at the time of its resolution, as implied by the write-downs made by Santander, was
negative 2%.”).
235. Smith, supra note 10.
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